OwlCyberSecurity - MANAGER

Edit File: lsm_hooks.h

/* * Linux Security Module interfaces * * Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com> * Copyright (C) 2001 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> * Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com> * Copyright (C) 2001 James Morris <jmorris@intercode.com.au> * Copyright (C) 2001 Silicon Graphics, Inc. (Trust Technology Group) * Copyright (C) 2015 Intel Corporation. * Copyright (C) 2015 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Techonologies * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * * Due to this file being licensed under the GPL there is controversy over * whether this permits you to write a module that #includes this file * without placing your module under the GPL. Please consult a lawyer for * advice before doing this. * */ #ifndef __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H #define __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/rculist.h> /** * union security_list_options - Linux Security Module hook function list * * Security hooks for program execution operations. * * @bprm_set_creds: * Save security information in the bprm->security field, typically based * on information about the bprm->file, for later use by the apply_creds * hook. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for * transitions between security domains). * This hook may be called multiple times during a single execve, e.g. for * interpreters. The hook can tell whether it has already been called by * checking to see if @bprm->security is non-NULL. If so, then the hook * may decide either to retain the security information saved earlier or * to replace it. The hook must set @bprm->secureexec to 1 if a "secure * exec" has happened as a result of this hook call. The flag is used to * indicate the need for a sanitized execution environment, and is also * passed in the ELF auxiliary table on the initial stack to indicate * whether libc should enable secure mode. * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. * @bprm_check_security: * This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will * begin. It allows a check the @bprm->security value which is set in the * preceding set_creds call. The primary difference from set_creds is * that the argv list and envp list are reliably available in @bprm. This * hook may be called multiple times during a single execve; and in each * pass set_creds is called first. * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. * @bprm_committing_creds: * Prepare to install the new security attributes of a process being * transformed by an execve operation, based on the old credentials * pointed to by @current->cred and the information set in @bprm->cred by * the bprm_set_creds hook. @bprm points to the linux_binprm structure. * This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the process such * as closing open file descriptors to which access will no longer be * granted when the attributes are changed. This is called immediately * before commit_creds(). * @bprm_committed_creds: * Tidy up after the installation of the new security attributes of a * process being transformed by an execve operation. The new credentials * have, by this point, been set to @current->cred. @bprm points to the * linux_binprm structure. This hook is a good place to perform state * changes on the process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal * state. This is called immediately after commit_creds(). * * Security hooks for mount using fs_context. * [See also Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt] * * @fs_context_dup: * Allocate and attach a security structure to sc->security. This pointer * is initialised to NULL by the caller. * @fc indicates the new filesystem context. * @src_fc indicates the original filesystem context. * @fs_context_parse_param: * Userspace provided a parameter to configure a superblock. The LSM may * reject it with an error and may use it for itself, in which case it * should return 0; otherwise it should return -ENOPARAM to pass it on to * the filesystem. * @fc indicates the filesystem context. * @param The parameter * * Security hooks for filesystem operations. * * @sb_alloc_security: * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sb->s_security field. * The s_security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is * allocated. * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified. * Return 0 if operation was successful. * @sb_free_security: * Deallocate and clear the sb->s_security field. * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified. * @sb_statfs: * Check permission before obtaining filesystem statistics for the @mnt * mountpoint. * @dentry is a handle on the superblock for the filesystem. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @sb_mount: * Check permission before an object specified by @dev_name is mounted on * the mount point named by @nd. For an ordinary mount, @dev_name * identifies a device if the file system type requires a device. For a * remount (@flags & MS_REMOUNT), @dev_name is irrelevant. For a * loopback/bind mount (@flags & MS_BIND), @dev_name identifies the * pathname of the object being mounted. * @dev_name contains the name for object being mounted. * @path contains the path for mount point object. * @type contains the filesystem type. * @flags contains the mount flags. * @data contains the filesystem-specific data. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @sb_copy_data: * Allow mount option data to be copied prior to parsing by the filesystem, * so that the security module can extract security-specific mount * options cleanly (a filesystem may modify the data e.g. with strsep()). * This also allows the original mount data to be stripped of security- * specific options to avoid having to make filesystems aware of them. * @orig the original mount data copied from userspace. * @copy copied data which will be passed to the security module. * Returns 0 if the copy was successful. * @sb_remount: * Extracts security system specific mount options and verifies no changes * are being made to those options. * @sb superblock being remounted * @data contains the filesystem-specific data. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @sb_umount: * Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted. * @mnt contains the mounted file system. * @flags contains the unmount flags, e.g. MNT_FORCE. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @sb_pivotroot: * Check permission before pivoting the root filesystem. * @old_path contains the path for the new location of the * current root (put_old). * @new_path contains the path for the new root (new_root). * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @sb_set_mnt_opts: * Set the security relevant mount options used for a superblock * @sb the superblock to set security mount options for * @opts binary data structure containing all lsm mount data * @sb_clone_mnt_opts: * Copy all security options from a given superblock to another * @oldsb old superblock which contain information to clone * @newsb new superblock which needs filled in * @sb_parse_opts_str: * Parse a string of security data filling in the opts structure * @options string containing all mount options known by the LSM * @opts binary data structure usable by the LSM * @move_mount: * Check permission before a mount is moved. * @from_path indicates the mount that is going to be moved. * @to_path indicates the mountpoint that will be mounted upon. * @dentry_init_security: * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available * since NFSv4 has no label backed by an EA anyway. * @dentry dentry to use in calculating the context. * @mode mode used to determine resource type. * @name name of the last path component used to create file * @ctx pointer to place the pointer to the resulting context in. * @ctxlen point to place the length of the resulting context. * @dentry_create_files_as: * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available * and set that context in passed in creds so that new files are * created using that context. Context is calculated using the * passed in creds and not the creds of the caller. * @dentry dentry to use in calculating the context. * @mode mode used to determine resource type. * @name name of the last path component used to create file * @old creds which should be used for context calculation * @new creds to modify * * * Security hooks for inode operations. * * @inode_alloc_security: * Allocate and attach a security structure to @inode->i_security. The * i_security field is initialized to NULL when the inode structure is * allocated. * @inode contains the inode structure. * Return 0 if operation was successful. * @inode_free_security: * @inode contains the inode structure. * Deallocate the inode security structure and set @inode->i_security to * NULL. * @inode_init_security: * Obtain the security attribute name suffix and value to set on a newly * created inode and set up the incore security field for the new inode. * This hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation * transaction and provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike * the post_create/mkdir/... hooks called by the VFS. The hook function * is expected to allocate the name and value via kmalloc, with the caller * being responsible for calling kfree after using them. * If the security module does not use security attributes or does * not wish to put a security attribute on this particular inode, * then it should return -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing. * @inode contains the inode structure of the newly created inode. * @dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory. * @qstr contains the last path component of the new object * @name will be set to the allocated name suffix (e.g. selinux). * @value will be set to the allocated attribute value. * @len will be set to the length of the value. * Returns 0 if @name and @value have been successfully set, * -EOPNOTSUPP if no security attribute is needed, or * -ENOMEM on memory allocation failure. * @inode_create: * Check permission to create a regular file. * @dir contains inode structure of the parent of the new file. * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file to be created. * @mode contains the file mode of the file to be created. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_link: * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure for an existing * link to the file. * @dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory * of the new link. * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_link: * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure for an existing link * to the file. * @new_dir contains the path structure of the parent directory of * the new link. * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_unlink: * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. * @dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of the file. * @dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_unlink: * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. * @dir contains the path structure of parent directory of the file. * @dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_symlink: * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. * @dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of * the symbolic link. * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link. * @old_name contains the pathname of file. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_symlink: * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. * @dir contains the path structure of parent directory of * the symbolic link. * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link. * @old_name contains the pathname of file. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_mkdir: * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory * associated with inode structure @dir. * @dir contains the inode structure of parent of the directory * to be created. * @dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory. * @mode contains the mode of new directory. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_mkdir: * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory * associated with path structure @path. * @dir contains the path structure of parent of the directory * to be created. * @dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory. * @mode contains the mode of new directory. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_rmdir: * Check the permission to remove a directory. * @dir contains the inode structure of parent of the directory * to be removed. * @dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_rmdir: * Check the permission to remove a directory. * @dir contains the path structure of parent of the directory to be * removed. * @dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_mknod: * Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo * file created via the mknod system call). Note that if mknod operation * is being done for a regular file, then the create hook will be called * and not this hook. * @dir contains the inode structure of parent of the new file. * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the new file. * @mode contains the mode of the new file. * @dev contains the device number. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_mknod: * Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called * even if mknod operation is being done for a regular file. * @dir contains the path structure of parent of the new file. * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the new file. * @mode contains the mode of the new file. * @dev contains the undecoded device number. Use new_decode_dev() to get * the decoded device number. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_rename: * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. * @old_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the old link. * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure of the old link. * @new_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the new link. * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_rename: * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. * @old_dir contains the path structure for parent of the old link. * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure of the old link. * @new_dir contains the path structure for parent of the new link. * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_chmod: * Check for permission to change a mode of the file @path. The new * mode is specified in @mode. * @path contains the path structure of the file to change the mode. * @mode contains the new DAC's permission, which is a bitmask of * constants from <include/uapi/linux/stat.h> * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_chown: * Check for permission to change owner/group of a file or directory. * @path contains the path structure. * @uid contains new owner's ID. * @gid contains new group's ID. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_chroot: * Check for permission to change root directory. * @path contains the path structure. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_notify: * Check permissions before setting a watch on events as defined by @mask, * on an object at @path, whose type is defined by @obj_type. * @inode_readlink: * Check the permission to read the symbolic link. * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file link. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_follow_link: * Check permission to follow a symbolic link when looking up a pathname. * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the link. * @inode contains the inode, which itself is not stable in RCU-walk * @rcu indicates whether we are in RCU-walk mode. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_permission: * Check permission before accessing an inode. This hook is called by the * existing Linux permission function, so a security module can use it to * provide additional checking for existing Linux permission checks. * Notice that this hook is called when a file is opened (as well as many * other operations), whereas the file_security_ops permission hook is * called when the actual read/write operations are performed. * @inode contains the inode structure to check. * @mask contains the permission mask. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_setattr: * Check permission before setting file attributes. Note that the kernel * call to notify_change is performed from several locations, whenever * file attributes change (such as when a file is truncated, chown/chmod * operations, transferring disk quotas, etc). * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file. * @attr is the iattr structure containing the new file attributes. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_truncate: * Check permission before truncating a file. * @path contains the path structure for the file. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_getattr: * Check permission before obtaining file attributes. * @path contains the path structure for the file. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_setxattr: * Check permission before setting the extended attributes * @value identified by @name for @dentry. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_post_setxattr: * Update inode security field after successful setxattr operation. * @value identified by @name for @dentry. * @inode_getxattr: * Check permission before obtaining the extended attributes * identified by @name for @dentry. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_listxattr: * Check permission before obtaining the list of extended attribute * names for @dentry. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_removexattr: * Check permission before removing the extended attribute * identified by @name for @dentry. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_getsecurity: * Retrieve a copy of the extended attribute representation of the * security label associated with @name for @inode via @buffer. Note that * @name is the remainder of the attribute name after the security prefix * has been removed. @alloc is used to specify of the call should return a * value via the buffer or just the value length Return size of buffer on * success. * @inode_setsecurity: * Set the security label associated with @name for @inode from the * extended attribute value @value. @size indicates the size of the * @value in bytes. @flags may be XATTR_CREATE, XATTR_REPLACE, or 0. * Note that @name is the remainder of the attribute name after the * security. prefix has been removed. * Return 0 on success. * @inode_listsecurity: * Copy the extended attribute names for the security labels * associated with @inode into @buffer. The maximum size of @buffer * is specified by @buffer_size. @buffer may be NULL to request * the size of the buffer required. * Returns number of bytes used/required on success. * @inode_need_killpriv: * Called when an inode has been changed. * @dentry is the dentry being changed. * Return <0 on error to abort the inode change operation. * Return 0 if inode_killpriv does not need to be called. * Return >0 if inode_killpriv does need to be called. * @inode_killpriv: * The setuid bit is being removed. Remove similar security labels. * Called with the dentry->d_inode->i_mutex held. * @dentry is the dentry being changed. * Return 0 on success. If error is returned, then the operation * causing setuid bit removal is failed. * @inode_getsecid: * Get the secid associated with the node. * @inode contains a pointer to the inode. * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved. * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. * @inode_copy_up: * A file is about to be copied up from lower layer to upper layer of * overlay filesystem. Security module can prepare a set of new creds * and modify as need be and return new creds. Caller will switch to * new creds temporarily to create new file and release newly allocated * creds. * @src indicates the union dentry of file that is being copied up. * @new pointer to pointer to return newly allocated creds. * Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on error. * @inode_copy_up_xattr: * Filter the xattrs being copied up when a unioned file is copied * up from a lower layer to the union/overlay layer. * @name indicates the name of the xattr. * Returns 0 to accept the xattr, 1 to discard the xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP if * security module does not know about attribute or a negative error code * to abort the copy up. Note that the caller is responsible for reading * and writing the xattrs as this hook is merely a filter. * * Security hooks for kernfs node operations * * @kernfs_init_security: * Initialize the security context of a newly created kernfs node based * on its own and its parent's attributes. * * @kn_dir the parent kernfs node * @kn the new child kernfs node * * Security hooks for file operations * * @file_permission: * Check file permissions before accessing an open file. This hook is * called by various operations that read or write files. A security * module can use this hook to perform additional checking on these * operations, e.g. to revalidate permissions on use to support privilege * bracketing or policy changes. Notice that this hook is used when the * actual read/write operations are performed, whereas the * inode_security_ops hook is called when a file is opened (as well as * many other operations). * Caveat: Although this hook can be used to revalidate permissions for * various system call operations that read or write files, it does not * address the revalidation of permissions for memory-mapped files. * Security modules must handle this separately if they need such * revalidation. * @file contains the file structure being accessed. * @mask contains the requested permissions. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @file_alloc_security: * Allocate and attach a security structure to the file->f_security field. * The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first * created. * @file contains the file structure to secure. * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. * @file_free_security: * Deallocate and free any security structures stored in file->f_security. * @file contains the file structure being modified. * @file_ioctl: * @file contains the file structure. * @cmd contains the operation to perform. * @arg contains the operational arguments. * Check permission for an ioctl operation on @file. Note that @arg * sometimes represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a * simple integer value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it * should never be used by the security module. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @mmap_addr : * Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr. * @addr contains virtual address that will be used for the operation. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @mmap_file : * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g. * if mapping anonymous memory. * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL). * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application. * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel. * @flags contains the operational flags. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @file_mprotect: * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions. * @vma contains the memory region to modify. * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application. * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @file_lock: * Check permission before performing file locking operations. * Note the hook mediates both flock and fcntl style locks. * @file contains the file structure. * @cmd contains the posix-translated lock operation to perform * (e.g. F_RDLCK, F_WRLCK). * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @file_fcntl: * Check permission before allowing the file operation specified by @cmd * from being performed on the file @file. Note that @arg sometimes * represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple * integer value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it should * never be used by the security module. * @file contains the file structure. * @cmd contains the operation to be performed. * @arg contains the operational arguments. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @file_set_fowner: * Save owner security information (typically from current->security) in * file->f_security for later use by the send_sigiotask hook. * @file contains the file structure to update. * Return 0 on success. * @file_send_sigiotask: * Check permission for the file owner @fown to send SIGIO or SIGURG to the * process @tsk. Note that this hook is sometimes called from interrupt. * Note that the fown_struct, @fown, is never outside the context of a * struct file, so the file structure (and associated security information) * can always be obtained: container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner) * @tsk contains the structure of task receiving signal. * @fown contains the file owner information. * @sig is the signal that will be sent. When 0, kernel sends SIGIO. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @file_receive: * This hook allows security modules to control the ability of a process * to receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC. * @file contains the file structure being received. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @file_open: * Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon * file_permission, and recheck access if anything has changed * since inode_permission. * * Security hooks for task operations. * * @task_alloc: * @task task being allocated. * @clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared. * Handle allocation of task-related resources. * Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. * @task_free: * @task task about to be freed. * Handle release of task-related resources. (Note that this can be called * from interrupt context.) * @cred_alloc_blank: * @cred points to the credentials. * @gfp indicates the atomicity of any memory allocations. * Only allocate sufficient memory and attach to @cred such that * cred_transfer() will not get ENOMEM. * @cred_free: * @cred points to the credentials. * Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials. * @cred_prepare: * @new points to the new credentials. * @old points to the original credentials. * @gfp indicates the atomicity of any memory allocations. * Prepare a new set of credentials by copying the data from the old set. * @cred_transfer: * @new points to the new credentials. * @old points to the original credentials. * Transfer data from original creds to new creds * @cred_getsecid: * Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c * @c contains the credentials, secid will be placed into @secid. * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. * @kernel_act_as: * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context). * @new points to the credentials to be modified. * @secid specifies the security ID to be set * The current task must be the one that nominated @secid. * Return 0 if successful. * @kernel_create_files_as: * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same as * the objective context of the specified inode. * @new points to the credentials to be modified. * @inode points to the inode to use as a reference. * The current task must be the one that nominated @inode. * Return 0 if successful. * @kernel_module_request: * Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for * userspace to load a kernel module with the given name. * @kmod_name name of the module requested by the kernel * Return 0 if successful. * @kernel_load_data: * Load data provided by userspace. * @id kernel load data identifier * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @kernel_read_file: * Read a file specified by userspace. * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file being read * by the kernel. * @id kernel read file identifier * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @kernel_post_read_file: * Read a file specified by userspace. * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file being read * by the kernel. * @buf pointer to buffer containing the file contents. * @size length of the file contents. * @id kernel read file identifier * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_fix_setuid: * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user * identity attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter * indicates which of the set*uid system calls invoked this hook. If * @new is the set of credentials that will be installed. Modifications * should be made to this rather than to @current->cred. * @old is the set of credentials that are being replaces * @flags contains one of the LSM_SETID_* values. * Return 0 on success. * @task_setpgid: * Check permission before setting the process group identifier of the * process @p to @pgid. * @p contains the task_struct for process being modified. * @pgid contains the new pgid. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_getpgid: * Check permission before getting the process group identifier of the * process @p. * @p contains the task_struct for the process. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_getsid: * Check permission before getting the session identifier of the process * @p. * @p contains the task_struct for the process. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_getsecid: * Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p. * @p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid. * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. * * @task_setnice: * Check permission before setting the nice value of @p to @nice. * @p contains the task_struct of process. * @nice contains the new nice value. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_setioprio: * Check permission before setting the ioprio value of @p to @ioprio. * @p contains the task_struct of process. * @ioprio contains the new ioprio value * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_getioprio: * Check permission before getting the ioprio value of @p. * @p contains the task_struct of process. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_prlimit: * Check permission before getting and/or setting the resource limits of * another task. * @cred points to the cred structure for the current task. * @tcred points to the cred structure for the target task. * @flags contains the LSM_PRLIMIT_* flag bits indicating whether the * resource limits are being read, modified, or both. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_setrlimit: * Check permission before setting the resource limits of process @p * for @resource to @new_rlim. The old resource limit values can * be examined by dereferencing (p->signal->rlim + resource). * @p points to the task_struct for the target task's group leader. * @resource contains the resource whose limit is being set. * @new_rlim contains the new limits for @resource. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_setscheduler: * Check permission before setting scheduling policy and/or parameters of * process @p. * @p contains the task_struct for process. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_getscheduler: * Check permission before obtaining scheduling information for process * @p. * @p contains the task_struct for process. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_movememory: * Check permission before moving memory owned by process @p. * @p contains the task_struct for process. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_kill: * Check permission before sending signal @sig to @p. @info can be NULL, * the constant 1, or a pointer to a kernel_siginfo structure. If @info is 1 or * SI_FROMKERNEL(info) is true, then the signal should be viewed as coming * from the kernel and should typically be permitted. * SIGIO signals are handled separately by the send_sigiotask hook in * file_security_ops. * @p contains the task_struct for process. * @info contains the signal information. * @sig contains the signal value. * @cred contains the cred of the process where the signal originated, or * NULL if the current task is the originator. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_prctl: * Check permission before performing a process control operation on the * current process. * @option contains the operation. * @arg2 contains a argument. * @arg3 contains a argument. * @arg4 contains a argument. * @arg5 contains a argument. * Return -ENOSYS if no-one wanted to handle this op, any other value to * cause prctl() to return immediately with that value. * @task_to_inode: * Set the security attributes for an inode based on an associated task's * security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes. * @p contains the task_struct for the task. * @inode contains the inode structure for the inode. * * Security hooks for Netlink messaging. * * @netlink_send: * Save security information for a netlink message so that permission * checking can be performed when the message is processed. The security * information can be saved using the eff_cap field of the * netlink_skb_parms structure. Also may be used to provide fine * grained control over message transmission. * @sk associated sock of task sending the message. * @skb contains the sk_buff structure for the netlink message. * Return 0 if the information was successfully saved and message * is allowed to be transmitted. * * Security hooks for Unix domain networking. * * @unix_stream_connect: * Check permissions before establishing a Unix domain stream connection * between @sock and @other. * @sock contains the sock structure. * @other contains the peer sock structure. * @newsk contains the new sock structure. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @unix_may_send: * Check permissions before connecting or sending datagrams from @sock to * @other. * @sock contains the socket structure. * @other contains the peer socket structure. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix * domain sockets. Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated. Sufficient * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code. * * Security hooks for socket operations. * * @socket_create: * Check permissions prior to creating a new socket. * @family contains the requested protocol family. * @type contains the requested communications type. * @protocol contains the requested protocol. * @kern set to 1 if a kernel socket. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_post_create: * This hook allows a module to update or allocate a per-socket security * structure. Note that the security field was not added directly to the * socket structure, but rather, the socket security information is stored * in the associated inode. Typically, the inode alloc_security hook will * allocate and and attach security information to * SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security. This hook may be used to update the * SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security field with additional information that * wasn't available when the inode was allocated. * @sock contains the newly created socket structure. * @family contains the requested protocol family. * @type contains the requested communications type. * @protocol contains the requested protocol. * @kern set to 1 if a kernel socket. * @socket_socketpair: * Check permissions before creating a fresh pair of sockets. * @socka contains the first socket structure. * @sockb contains the second socket structure. * Return 0 if permission is granted and the connection was established. * @socket_bind: * Check permission before socket protocol layer bind operation is * performed and the socket @sock is bound to the address specified in the * @address parameter. * @sock contains the socket structure. * @address contains the address to bind to. * @addrlen contains the length of address. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_connect: * Check permission before socket protocol layer connect operation * attempts to connect socket @sock to a remote address, @address. * @sock contains the socket structure. * @address contains the address of remote endpoint. * @addrlen contains the length of address. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_listen: * Check permission before socket protocol layer listen operation. * @sock contains the socket structure. * @backlog contains the maximum length for the pending connection queue. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_accept: * Check permission before accepting a new connection. Note that the new * socket, @newsock, has been created and some information copied to it, * but the accept operation has not actually been performed. * @sock contains the listening socket structure. * @newsock contains the newly created server socket for connection. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_sendmsg: * Check permission before transmitting a message to another socket. * @sock contains the socket structure. * @msg contains the message to be transmitted. * @size contains the size of message. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_recvmsg: * Check permission before receiving a message from a socket. * @sock contains the socket structure. * @msg contains the message structure. * @size contains the size of message structure. * @flags contains the operational flags. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_getsockname: * Check permission before the local address (name) of the socket object * @sock is retrieved. * @sock contains the socket structure. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_getpeername: * Check permission before the remote address (name) of a socket object * @sock is retrieved. * @sock contains the socket structure. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_getsockopt: * Check permissions before retrieving the options associated with socket * @sock. * @sock contains the socket structure. * @level contains the protocol level to retrieve option from. * @optname contains the name of option to retrieve. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_setsockopt: * Check permissions before setting the options associated with socket * @sock. * @sock contains the socket structure. * @level contains the protocol level to set options for. * @optname contains the name of the option to set. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_shutdown: * Checks permission before all or part of a connection on the socket * @sock is shut down. * @sock contains the socket structure. * @how contains the flag indicating how future sends and receives * are handled. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_sock_rcv_skb: * Check permissions on incoming network packets. This hook is distinct * from Netfilter's IP input hooks since it is the first time that the * incoming sk_buff @skb has been associated with a particular socket, @sk. * Must not sleep inside this hook because some callers hold spinlocks. * @sk contains the sock (not socket) associated with the incoming sk_buff. * @skb contains the incoming network data. * @socket_getpeersec_stream: * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security * state for unix or connected tcp sockets to userspace via getsockopt * SO_GETPEERSEC. For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the * socket is associated with an ipsec SA. * @sock is the local socket. * @optval userspace memory where the security state is to be copied. * @optlen userspace int where the module should copy the actual length * of the security state. * @len as input is the maximum length to copy to userspace provided * by the caller. * Return 0 if all is well, otherwise, typical getsockopt return * values. * @socket_getpeersec_dgram: * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security * state for udp sockets on a per-packet basis to userspace via * getsockopt SO_GETPEERSEC. The application must first have indicated * the IP_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. It can then retrieve the * security state returned by this hook for a packet via the SCM_SECURITY * ancillary message type. * @sock contains the peer socket. May be NULL. * @skb is the sk_buff for the packet being queried. May be NULL. * @secid pointer to store the secid of the packet. * Return 0 on success, error on failure. * @sk_alloc_security: * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sk->sk_security field, * which is used to copy security attributes between local stream sockets. * @sk_free_security: * Deallocate security structure. * @sk_clone_security: * Clone/copy security structure. * @sk_getsecid: * Retrieve the LSM-specific secid for the sock to enable caching * of network authorizations. * @sock_graft: * Sets the socket's isec sid to the sock's sid. * @inet_conn_request: * Sets the openreq's sid to socket's sid with MLS portion taken * from peer sid. * @inet_csk_clone: * Sets the new child socket's sid to the openreq sid. * @inet_conn_established: * Sets the connection's peersid to the secmark on skb. * @secmark_relabel_packet: * check if the process should be allowed to relabel packets to * the given secid * @secmark_refcount_inc: * tells the LSM to increment the number of secmark labeling rules loaded * @secmark_refcount_dec: * tells the LSM to decrement the number of secmark labeling rules loaded * @req_classify_flow: * Sets the flow's sid to the openreq sid. * @tun_dev_alloc_security: * This hook allows a module to allocate a security structure for a TUN * device. * @security pointer to a security structure pointer. * Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. * @tun_dev_free_security: * This hook allows a module to free the security structure for a TUN * device. * @security pointer to the TUN device's security structure * @tun_dev_create: * Check permissions prior to creating a new TUN device. * @tun_dev_attach_queue: * Check permissions prior to attaching to a TUN device queue. * @security pointer to the TUN device's security structure. * @tun_dev_attach: * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state * associated with the TUN device's sock structure. * @sk contains the existing sock structure. * @security pointer to the TUN device's security structure. * @tun_dev_open: * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state * associated with the TUN device's security structure. * @security pointer to the TUN devices's security structure. * * Security hooks for SCTP * * @sctp_assoc_request: * Passes the @ep and @chunk->skb of the association INIT packet to * the security module. * @ep pointer to sctp endpoint structure. * @skb pointer to skbuff of association packet. * Return 0 on success, error on failure. * @sctp_bind_connect: * Validiate permissions required for each address associated with sock * @sk. Depending on @optname, the addresses will be treated as either * for a connect or bind service. The @addrlen is calculated on each * ipv4 and ipv6 address using sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) or * sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6). * @sk pointer to sock structure. * @optname name of the option to validate. * @address list containing one or more ipv4/ipv6 addresses. * @addrlen total length of address(s). * Return 0 on success, error on failure. * @sctp_sk_clone: * Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) (i.e. a TCP * style socket) or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace * calls sctp_peeloff(3). * @ep pointer to current sctp endpoint structure. * @sk pointer to current sock structure. * @sk pointer to new sock structure. * * Security hooks for Infiniband * * @ib_pkey_access: * Check permission to access a pkey when modifing a QP. * @subnet_prefix the subnet prefix of the port being used. * @pkey the pkey to be accessed. * @sec pointer to a security structure. * @ib_endport_manage_subnet: * Check permissions to send and receive SMPs on a end port. * @dev_name the IB device name (i.e. mlx4_0). * @port_num the port number. * @sec pointer to a security structure. * @ib_alloc_security: * Allocate a security structure for Infiniband objects. * @sec pointer to a security structure pointer. * Returns 0 on success, non-zero on failure * @ib_free_security: * Deallocate an Infiniband security structure. * @sec contains the security structure to be freed. * * Security hooks for XFRM operations. * * @xfrm_policy_alloc_security: * @ctxp is a pointer to the xfrm_sec_ctx being added to Security Policy * Database used by the XFRM system. * @sec_ctx contains the security context information being provided by * the user-level policy update program (e.g., setkey). * Allocate a security structure to the xp->security field; the security * field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_policy is allocated. * Return 0 if operation was successful (memory to allocate, legal context) * @gfp is to specify the context for the allocation * @xfrm_policy_clone_security: * @old_ctx contains an existing xfrm_sec_ctx. * @new_ctxp contains a new xfrm_sec_ctx being cloned from old. * Allocate a security structure in new_ctxp that contains the * information from the old_ctx structure. * Return 0 if operation was successful (memory to allocate). * @xfrm_policy_free_security: * @ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx * Deallocate xp->security. * @xfrm_policy_delete_security: * @ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx. * Authorize deletion of xp->security. * @xfrm_state_alloc: * @x contains the xfrm_state being added to the Security Association * Database by the XFRM system. * @sec_ctx contains the security context information being provided by * the user-level SA generation program (e.g., setkey or racoon). * Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security * field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the * context to correspond to sec_ctx. Return 0 if operation was successful * (memory to allocate, legal context). * @xfrm_state_alloc_acquire: * @x contains the xfrm_state being added to the Security Association * Database by the XFRM system. * @polsec contains the policy's security context. * @secid contains the secid from which to take the mls portion of the * context. * Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security * field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the * context to correspond to secid. Return 0 if operation was successful * (memory to allocate, legal context). * @xfrm_state_free_security: * @x contains the xfrm_state. * Deallocate x->security. * @xfrm_state_delete_security: * @x contains the xfrm_state. * Authorize deletion of x->security. * @xfrm_policy_lookup: * @ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx for which the access control is being * checked. * @fl_secid contains the flow security label that is used to authorize * access to the policy xp. * @dir contains the direction of the flow (input or output). * Check permission when a flow selects a xfrm_policy for processing * XFRMs on a packet. The hook is called when selecting either a * per-socket policy or a generic xfrm policy. * Return 0 if permission is granted, -ESRCH otherwise, or -errno * on other errors. * @xfrm_state_pol_flow_match: * @x contains the state to match. * @xp contains the policy to check for a match. * @fl contains the flow to check for a match. * Return 1 if there is a match. * @xfrm_decode_session: * @skb points to skb to decode. * @secid points to the flow key secid to set. * @ckall says if all xfrms used should be checked for same secid. * Return 0 if ckall is zero or all xfrms used have the same secid. * * Security hooks affecting all Key Management operations * * @key_alloc: * Permit allocation of a key and assign security data. Note that key does * not have a serial number assigned at this point. * @key points to the key. * @flags is the allocation flags * Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. * @key_free: * Notification of destruction; free security data. * @key points to the key. * No return value. * @key_permission: * See whether a specific operational right is granted to a process on a * key. * @key_ref refers to the key (key pointer + possession attribute bit). * @cred points to the credentials to provide the context against which to * evaluate the security data on the key. * @perm describes the combination of permissions required of this key. * Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. * @key_getsecurity: * Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key * for the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY. This function * allocates the storage for the NUL-terminated string and the caller * should free it. * @key points to the key to be queried. * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs). * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if * an error. * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label. * * Security hooks affecting all System V IPC operations. * * @ipc_permission: * Check permissions for access to IPC * @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure * @flag contains the desired (requested) permission set * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @ipc_getsecid: * Get the secid associated with the ipc object. * @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure. * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved. * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. * * Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues * @msg_msg_alloc_security: * Allocate and attach a security structure to the msg->security field. * The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first * created. * @msg contains the message structure to be modified. * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. * @msg_msg_free_security: * Deallocate the security structure for this message. * @msg contains the message structure to be modified. * * Security hooks for System V IPC Message Queues * * @msg_queue_alloc_security: * Allocate and attach a security structure to the * @perm->security field. The security field is initialized to * NULL when the structure is first created. * @perm contains the IPC permissions of the message queue. * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. * @msg_queue_free_security: * Deallocate security field @perm->security for the message queue. * @perm contains the IPC permissions of the message queue. * @msg_queue_associate: * Check permission when a message queue is requested through the * msgget system call. This hook is only called when returning the * message queue identifier for an existing message queue, not when a * new message queue is created. * @perm contains the IPC permissions of the message queue. * @msqflg contains the operation control flags. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @msg_queue_msgctl: * Check permission when a message control operation specified by @cmd * is to be performed on the message queue with permissions @perm. * The @perm may be NULL, e.g. for IPC_INFO or MSG_INFO. * @perm contains the IPC permissions of the msg queue. May be NULL. * @cmd contains the operation to be performed. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @msg_queue_msgsnd: * Check permission before a message, @msg, is enqueued on the message * queue with permissions @perm. * @perm contains the IPC permissions of the message queue. * @msg contains the message to be enqueued. * @msqflg contains operational flags. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @msg_queue_msgrcv: * Check permission before a message, @msg, is removed from the message * queue. The @target task structure contains a pointer to the * process that will be receiving the message (not equal to the current * process when inline receives are being performed). * @perm contains the IPC permissions of the message queue. * @msg contains the message destination. * @target contains the task structure for recipient process. * @type contains the type of message requested. * @mode contains the operational flags. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * * Security hooks for System V Shared Memory Segments * * @shm_alloc_security: * Allocate and attach a security structure to the @perm->security * field. The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is * first created. * @perm contains the IPC permissions of the shared memory structure. * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. * @shm_free_security: * Deallocate the security structure @perm->security for the memory segment. * @perm contains the IPC permissions of the shared memory structure. * @shm_associate: * Check permission when a shared memory region is requested through the * shmget system call. This hook is only called when returning the shared * memory region identifier for an existing region, not when a new shared * memory region is created. * @perm contains the IPC permissions of the shared memory structure. * @shmflg contains the operation control flags. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @shm_shmctl: * Check permission when a shared memory control operation specified by * @cmd is to be performed on the shared memory region with permissions @perm. * The @perm may be NULL, e.g. for IPC_INFO or SHM_INFO. * @perm contains the IPC permissions of the shared memory structure. * @cmd contains the operation to be performed. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @shm_shmat: * Check permissions prior to allowing the shmat system call to attach the * shared memory segment with permissions @perm to the data segment of the * calling process. The attaching address is specified by @shmaddr. * @perm contains the IPC permissions of the shared memory structure. * @shmaddr contains the address to attach memory region to. * @shmflg contains the operational flags. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * * Security hooks for System V Semaphores * * @sem_alloc_security: * Allocate and attach a security structure to the @perm->security * field. The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is * first created. * @perm contains the IPC permissions of the semaphore. * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. * @sem_free_security: * Deallocate security structure @perm->security for the semaphore. * @perm contains the IPC permissions of the semaphore. * @sem_associate: * Check permission when a semaphore is requested through the semget * system call. This hook is only called when returning the semaphore * identifier for an existing semaphore, not when a new one must be * created. * @perm contains the IPC permissions of the semaphore. * @semflg contains the operation control flags. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @sem_semctl: * Check permission when a semaphore operation specified by @cmd is to be * performed on the semaphore. The @perm may be NULL, e.g. for * IPC_INFO or SEM_INFO. * @perm contains the IPC permissions of the semaphore. May be NULL. * @cmd contains the operation to be performed. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @sem_semop: * Check permissions before performing operations on members of the * semaphore set. If the @alter flag is nonzero, the semaphore set * may be modified. * @perm contains the IPC permissions of the semaphore. * @sops contains the operations to perform. * @nsops contains the number of operations to perform. * @alter contains the flag indicating whether changes are to be made. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * * @binder_set_context_mgr: * Check whether @mgr is allowed to be the binder context manager. * @mgr contains the struct cred for the current binder process. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @binder_transaction: * Check whether @from is allowed to invoke a binder transaction call * to @to. * @from contains the struct cred for the sending process. * @to contains the struct cred for the receiving process. * @binder_transfer_binder: * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer a binder reference to @to. * @from contains the struct cred for the sending process. * @to contains the struct cred for the receiving process. * @binder_transfer_file: * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer @file to @to. * @from contains the struct cred for the sending process. * @file contains the struct file being transferred. * @to contains the struct cred for the receiving process. * * @ptrace_access_check: * Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the * @child process. * Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check * during an execve in the set_security or apply_creds hooks of * tracing check during an execve in the bprm_set_creds hook of * binprm_security_ops if the process is being traced and its security * attributes would be changed by the execve. * @child contains the task_struct structure for the target process. * @mode contains the PTRACE_MODE flags indicating the form of access. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @ptrace_traceme: * Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the * current process before allowing the current process to present itself * to the @parent process for tracing. * @parent contains the task_struct structure for debugger process. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @capget: * Get the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for * the @target process. The hook may also perform permission checking to * determine if the current process is allowed to see the capability sets * of the @target process. * @target contains the task_struct structure for target process. * @effective contains the effective capability set. * @inheritable contains the inheritable capability set. * @permitted contains the permitted capability set. * Return 0 if the capability sets were successfully obtained. * @capset: * Set the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for * the current process. * @new contains the new credentials structure for target process. * @old contains the current credentials structure for target process. * @effective contains the effective capability set. * @inheritable contains the inheritable capability set. * @permitted contains the permitted capability set. * Return 0 and update @new if permission is granted. * @capable: * Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated * credentials. * @cred contains the credentials to use. * @ns contains the user namespace we want the capability in * @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>. * @opts contains options for the capable check <include/linux/security.h> * Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk. * @syslog: * Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing * logging to the console. * See the syslog(2) manual page for an explanation of the @type values. * @type contains the SYSLOG_ACTION_* constant from <include/linux/syslog.h> * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @settime: * Check permission to change the system time. * struct timespec64 is defined in <include/linux/time64.h> and timezone * is defined in <include/linux/time.h> * @ts contains new time * @tz contains new timezone * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @vm_enough_memory: * Check permissions for allocating a new virtual mapping. * @mm contains the mm struct it is being added to. * @pages contains the number of pages. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * * @ismaclabel: * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name * represents a MAC label. Returns 1 if name is a MAC * attribute otherwise returns 0. * @name full extended attribute name to check against * LSM as a MAC label. * * @secid_to_secctx: * Convert secid to security context. If secdata is NULL the length of * the result will be returned in seclen, but no secdata will be returned. * This does mean that the length could change between calls to check the * length and the next call which actually allocates and returns the * secdata. * @secid contains the security ID. * @secdata contains the pointer that stores the converted security * context. * @seclen pointer which contains the length of the data * @secctx_to_secid: * Convert security context to secid. * @secid contains the pointer to the generated security ID. * @secdata contains the security context. * * @release_secctx: * Release the security context. * @secdata contains the security context. * @seclen contains the length of the security context. * * Security hooks for Audit * * @audit_rule_init: * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure. * @field contains the required Audit action. * Fields flags are defined in <include/linux/audit.h> * @op contains the operator the rule uses. * @rulestr contains the context where the rule will be applied to. * @lsmrule contains a pointer to receive the result. * Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, * -EINVAL in case of an invalid rule. * * @audit_rule_known: * Specifies whether given @krule contains any fields related to * current LSM. * @krule contains the audit rule of interest. * Return 1 in case of relation found, 0 otherwise. * * @audit_rule_match: * Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved * by @audit_rule_known. * @secid contains the security id in question. * @field contains the field which relates to current LSM. * @op contains the operator that will be used for matching. * @lrule points to the audit rule that will be checked against. * Return 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on failure. * * @audit_rule_free: * Deallocate the LSM audit rule structure previously allocated by * audit_rule_init. * @lsmrule contains the allocated rule * * @inode_invalidate_secctx: * Notify the security module that it must revalidate the security context * of an inode. * * @inode_notifysecctx: * Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode * should be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the * security module for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes * this hook to initialize the security context in its incore inode to the * value provided by the server for the file when the server returned the * file's attributes to the client. * Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked. * @inode we wish to set the security context of. * @ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode. * @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx. * * @inode_setsecctx: * Change the security context of an inode. Updates the * incore security context managed by the security module and invokes the * fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing * xattrs that represent the context. Example usage: NFS server invokes * this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the * backing filesystem to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR * operation. * Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked. * @dentry contains the inode we wish to set the security context of. * @ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode. * @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx. * * @inode_getsecctx: * On success, returns 0 and fills out @ctx and @ctxlen with the security * context for the given @inode. * @inode we wish to get the security context of. * @ctx is a pointer in which to place the allocated security context. * @ctxlen points to the place to put the length of @ctx. * * Security hooks for using the eBPF maps and programs functionalities through * eBPF syscalls. * * @bpf: * Do a initial check for all bpf syscalls after the attribute is copied * into the kernel. The actual security module can implement their own * rules to check the specific cmd they need. * * @bpf_map: * Do a check when the kernel generate and return a file descriptor for * eBPF maps. * * @map: bpf map that we want to access * @mask: the access flags * * @bpf_prog: * Do a check when the kernel generate and return a file descriptor for * eBPF programs. * * @prog: bpf prog that userspace want to use. * * @bpf_map_alloc_security: * Initialize the security field inside bpf map. * * @bpf_map_free_security: * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf map. * * @bpf_prog_alloc_security: * Initialize the security field inside bpf program. * * @bpf_prog_free_security: * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf prog. * * @locked_down * Determine whether a kernel feature that potentially enables arbitrary * code execution in kernel space should be permitted. * * @what: kernel feature being accessed * * @lock_kernel_down * Put the kernel into lock-down mode. * * @where: Where the lock-down is originating from (e.g. command line option) * @level: The lock-down level (can only increase) */ union security_list_options { int (*binder_set_context_mgr)(const struct cred *mgr); int (*binder_transaction)(const struct cred *from, const struct cred *to); int (*binder_transfer_binder)(const struct cred *from, const struct cred *to); int (*binder_transfer_file)(const struct cred *from, const struct cred *to, struct file *file); int (*ptrace_access_check)(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode); int (*ptrace_traceme)(struct task_struct *parent); int (*capget)(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted); int (*capset)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted); int (*capable)(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, unsigned int opts); int (*quotactl)(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb); int (*quota_on)(struct dentry *dentry); int (*syslog)(int type); int (*settime)(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz); int (*vm_enough_memory)(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages); int (*bprm_set_creds)(struct linux_binprm *bprm); int (*bprm_check_security)(struct linux_binprm *bprm); void (*bprm_committing_creds)(struct linux_binprm *bprm); void (*bprm_committed_creds)(struct linux_binprm *bprm); int (*fs_context_dup)(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_sc); int (*fs_context_parse_param)(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param); int (*sb_alloc_security)(struct super_block *sb); void (*sb_free_security)(struct super_block *sb); void (*sb_free_mnt_opts)(void *mnt_opts); int (*sb_eat_lsm_opts)(char *orig, void **mnt_opts); int (*sb_remount)(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts); int (*sb_kern_mount)(struct super_block *sb); int (*sb_show_options)(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb); int (*sb_statfs)(struct dentry *dentry); int (*sb_mount)(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data); int (*sb_umount)(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags); int (*sb_pivotroot)(const struct path *old_path, const struct path *new_path); int (*sb_set_mnt_opts)(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts, unsigned long kern_flags, unsigned long *set_kern_flags); int (*sb_clone_mnt_opts)(const struct super_block *oldsb, struct super_block *newsb, unsigned long kern_flags, unsigned long *set_kern_flags); int (*sb_add_mnt_opt)(const char *option, const char *val, int len, void **mnt_opts); int (*move_mount)(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path); int (*dentry_init_security)(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, const struct qstr *name, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen); int (*dentry_create_files_as)(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, struct qstr *name, const struct cred *old, struct cred *new); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH int (*path_unlink)(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry); int (*path_mkdir)(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode); int (*path_rmdir)(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry); int (*path_mknod)(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, unsigned int dev); int (*path_truncate)(const struct path *path); int (*path_symlink)(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *old_name); int (*path_link)(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry); int (*path_rename)(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry); int (*path_chmod)(const struct path *path, umode_t mode); int (*path_chown)(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid); int (*path_chroot)(const struct path *path); #endif /* Needed for inode based security check */ int (*path_notify)(const struct path *path, u64 mask, unsigned int obj_type); int (*inode_alloc_security)(struct inode *inode); void (*inode_free_security)(struct inode *inode); int (*inode_init_security)(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, void **value, size_t *len); int (*inode_create)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode); int (*inode_link)(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry); int (*inode_unlink)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry); int (*inode_symlink)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *old_name); int (*inode_mkdir)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode); int (*inode_rmdir)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry); int (*inode_mknod)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev); int (*inode_rename)(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry); int (*inode_readlink)(struct dentry *dentry); int (*inode_follow_link)(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, bool rcu); int (*inode_permission)(struct inode *inode, int mask); int (*inode_setattr)(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr); int (*inode_getattr)(const struct path *path); int (*inode_setxattr)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags); void (*inode_post_setxattr)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags); int (*inode_getxattr)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name); int (*inode_listxattr)(struct dentry *dentry); int (*inode_removexattr)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name); int (*inode_need_killpriv)(struct dentry *dentry); int (*inode_killpriv)(struct dentry *dentry); int (*inode_getsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc); int (*inode_setsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags); int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size); void (*inode_getsecid)(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid); int (*inode_copy_up)(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new); int (*inode_copy_up_xattr)(const char *name); int (*kernfs_init_security)(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, struct kernfs_node *kn); int (*file_permission)(struct file *file, int mask); int (*file_alloc_security)(struct file *file); void (*file_free_security)(struct file *file); int (*file_ioctl)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); int (*mmap_addr)(unsigned long addr); int (*mmap_file)(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags); int (*file_mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot); int (*file_lock)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd); int (*file_fcntl)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); void (*file_set_fowner)(struct file *file); int (*file_send_sigiotask)(struct task_struct *tsk, struct fown_struct *fown, int sig); int (*file_receive)(struct file *file); int (*file_open)(struct file *file); int (*task_alloc)(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags); void (*task_free)(struct task_struct *task); int (*cred_alloc_blank)(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp); void (*cred_free)(struct cred *cred); int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp); void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid); int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid); int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name); int (*kernel_load_data)(enum kernel_load_data_id id); int (*kernel_read_file)(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id); int (*kernel_post_read_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id); int (*task_fix_setuid)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags); int (*task_setpgid)(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid); int (*task_getpgid)(struct task_struct *p); int (*task_getsid)(struct task_struct *p); void (*task_getsecid)(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); int (*task_setnice)(struct task_struct *p, int nice); int (*task_setioprio)(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio); int (*task_getioprio)(struct task_struct *p); int (*task_prlimit)(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred, unsigned int flags); int (*task_setrlimit)(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim); int (*task_setscheduler)(struct task_struct *p); int (*task_getscheduler)(struct task_struct *p); int (*task_movememory)(struct task_struct *p); int (*task_kill)(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info, int sig, const struct cred *cred); int (*task_prctl)(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5); void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode); int (*ipc_permission)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag); void (*ipc_getsecid)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid); int (*msg_msg_alloc_security)(struct msg_msg *msg); void (*msg_msg_free_security)(struct msg_msg *msg); int (*msg_queue_alloc_security)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm); void (*msg_queue_free_security)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm); int (*msg_queue_associate)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, int msqflg); int (*msg_queue_msgctl)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, int cmd); int (*msg_queue_msgsnd)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg); int (*msg_queue_msgrcv)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, struct msg_msg *msg, struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode); int (*shm_alloc_security)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm); void (*shm_free_security)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm); int (*shm_associate)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, int shmflg); int (*shm_shmctl)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, int cmd); int (*shm_shmat)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg); int (*sem_alloc_security)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm); void (*sem_free_security)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm); int (*sem_associate)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, int semflg); int (*sem_semctl)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, int cmd); int (*sem_semop)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter); int (*netlink_send)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); void (*d_instantiate)(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode); int (*getprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value); int (*setprocattr)(const char *name, void *value, size_t size); int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name); int (*secid_to_secctx)(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen); int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid); void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen); void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode); int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen); int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen); int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK int (*unix_stream_connect)(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk); int (*unix_may_send)(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other); int (*socket_create)(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern); int (*socket_post_create)(struct socket *sock, int family, int type, int protocol, int kern); int (*socket_socketpair)(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb); int (*socket_bind)(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen); int (*socket_connect)(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen); int (*socket_listen)(struct socket *sock, int backlog); int (*socket_accept)(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock); int (*socket_sendmsg)(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size); int (*socket_recvmsg)(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags); int (*socket_getsockname)(struct socket *sock); int (*socket_getpeername)(struct socket *sock); int (*socket_getsockopt)(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname); int (*socket_setsockopt)(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname); int (*socket_shutdown)(struct socket *sock, int how); int (*socket_sock_rcv_skb)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); int (*socket_getpeersec_stream)(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen, unsigned len); int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram)(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid); int (*sk_alloc_security)(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority); void (*sk_free_security)(struct sock *sk); void (*sk_clone_security)(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk); void (*sk_getsecid)(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid); void (*sock_graft)(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent); int (*inet_conn_request)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req); void (*inet_csk_clone)(struct sock *newsk, const struct request_sock *req); void (*inet_conn_established)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); int (*secmark_relabel_packet)(u32 secid); void (*secmark_refcount_inc)(void); void (*secmark_refcount_dec)(void); void (*req_classify_flow)(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl); int (*tun_dev_alloc_security)(void **security); void (*tun_dev_free_security)(void *security); int (*tun_dev_create)(void); int (*tun_dev_attach_queue)(void *security); int (*tun_dev_attach)(struct sock *sk, void *security); int (*tun_dev_open)(void *security); int (*sctp_assoc_request)(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sk_buff *skb); int (*sctp_bind_connect)(struct sock *sk, int optname, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen); void (*sctp_sk_clone)(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk); #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND int (*ib_pkey_access)(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey); int (*ib_endport_manage_subnet)(void *sec, const char *dev_name, u8 port_num); int (*ib_alloc_security)(void **sec); void (*ib_free_security)(void *sec); #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM int (*xfrm_policy_alloc_security)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, gfp_t gfp); int (*xfrm_policy_clone_security)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctx); void (*xfrm_policy_free_security)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx); int (*xfrm_policy_delete_security)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx); int (*xfrm_state_alloc)(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx); int (*xfrm_state_alloc_acquire)(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid); void (*xfrm_state_free_security)(struct xfrm_state *x); int (*xfrm_state_delete_security)(struct xfrm_state *x); int (*xfrm_policy_lookup)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir); int (*xfrm_state_pol_flow_match)(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp, const struct flowi *fl); int (*xfrm_decode_session)(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid, int ckall); #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ /* key management security hooks */ #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS int (*key_alloc)(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags); void (*key_free)(struct key *key); int (*key_permission)(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm); int (*key_getsecurity)(struct key *key, char **_buffer); #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT int (*audit_rule_init)(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); int (*audit_rule_known)(struct audit_krule *krule); int (*audit_rule_match)(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule); void (*audit_rule_free)(void *lsmrule); #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL int (*bpf)(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size); int (*bpf_map)(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode); int (*bpf_prog)(struct bpf_prog *prog); int (*bpf_map_alloc_security)(struct bpf_map *map); void (*bpf_map_free_security)(struct bpf_map *map); int (*bpf_prog_alloc_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux); void (*bpf_prog_free_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux); #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ int (*locked_down)(enum lockdown_reason what); int (*lock_kernel_down)(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level); }; struct security_hook_heads { struct hlist_head binder_set_context_mgr; struct hlist_head binder_transaction; struct hlist_head binder_transfer_binder; struct hlist_head binder_transfer_file; struct hlist_head ptrace_access_check; struct hlist_head ptrace_traceme; struct hlist_head capget; struct hlist_head capset; struct hlist_head capable; struct hlist_head quotactl; struct hlist_head quota_on; struct hlist_head syslog; struct hlist_head settime; struct hlist_head vm_enough_memory; struct hlist_head bprm_set_creds; struct hlist_head bprm_check_security; struct hlist_head bprm_committing_creds; struct hlist_head bprm_committed_creds; struct hlist_head fs_context_dup; struct hlist_head fs_context_parse_param; struct hlist_head sb_alloc_security; struct hlist_head sb_free_security; struct hlist_head sb_free_mnt_opts; struct hlist_head sb_eat_lsm_opts; struct hlist_head sb_remount; struct hlist_head sb_kern_mount; struct hlist_head sb_show_options; struct hlist_head sb_statfs; struct hlist_head sb_mount; struct hlist_head sb_umount; struct hlist_head sb_pivotroot; struct hlist_head sb_set_mnt_opts; struct hlist_head sb_clone_mnt_opts; struct hlist_head sb_add_mnt_opt; struct hlist_head move_mount; struct hlist_head dentry_init_security; struct hlist_head dentry_create_files_as; #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH struct hlist_head path_unlink; struct hlist_head path_mkdir; struct hlist_head path_rmdir; struct hlist_head path_mknod; struct hlist_head path_truncate; struct hlist_head path_symlink; struct hlist_head path_link; struct hlist_head path_rename; struct hlist_head path_chmod; struct hlist_head path_chown; struct hlist_head path_chroot; #endif /* Needed for inode based modules as well */ struct hlist_head path_notify; struct hlist_head inode_alloc_security; struct hlist_head inode_free_security; struct hlist_head inode_init_security; struct hlist_head inode_create; struct hlist_head inode_link; struct hlist_head inode_unlink; struct hlist_head inode_symlink; struct hlist_head inode_mkdir; struct hlist_head inode_rmdir; struct hlist_head inode_mknod; struct hlist_head inode_rename; struct hlist_head inode_readlink; struct hlist_head inode_follow_link; struct hlist_head inode_permission; struct hlist_head inode_setattr; struct hlist_head inode_getattr; struct hlist_head inode_setxattr; struct hlist_head inode_post_setxattr; struct hlist_head inode_getxattr; struct hlist_head inode_listxattr; struct hlist_head inode_removexattr; struct hlist_head inode_need_killpriv; struct hlist_head inode_killpriv; struct hlist_head inode_getsecurity; struct hlist_head inode_setsecurity; struct hlist_head inode_listsecurity; struct hlist_head inode_getsecid; struct hlist_head inode_copy_up; struct hlist_head inode_copy_up_xattr; struct hlist_head kernfs_init_security; struct hlist_head file_permission; struct hlist_head file_alloc_security; struct hlist_head file_free_security; struct hlist_head file_ioctl; struct hlist_head mmap_addr; struct hlist_head mmap_file; struct hlist_head file_mprotect; struct hlist_head file_lock; struct hlist_head file_fcntl; struct hlist_head file_set_fowner; struct hlist_head file_send_sigiotask; struct hlist_head file_receive; struct hlist_head file_open; struct hlist_head task_alloc; struct hlist_head task_free; struct hlist_head cred_alloc_blank; struct hlist_head cred_free; struct hlist_head cred_prepare; struct hlist_head cred_transfer; struct hlist_head cred_getsecid; struct hlist_head kernel_act_as; struct hlist_head kernel_create_files_as; struct hlist_head kernel_load_data; struct hlist_head kernel_read_file; struct hlist_head kernel_post_read_file; struct hlist_head kernel_module_request; struct hlist_head task_fix_setuid; struct hlist_head task_setpgid; struct hlist_head task_getpgid; struct hlist_head task_getsid; struct hlist_head task_getsecid; struct hlist_head task_setnice; struct hlist_head task_setioprio; struct hlist_head task_getioprio; struct hlist_head task_prlimit; struct hlist_head task_setrlimit; struct hlist_head task_setscheduler; struct hlist_head task_getscheduler; struct hlist_head task_movememory; struct hlist_head task_kill; struct hlist_head task_prctl; struct hlist_head task_to_inode; struct hlist_head ipc_permission; struct hlist_head ipc_getsecid; struct hlist_head msg_msg_alloc_security; struct hlist_head msg_msg_free_security; struct hlist_head msg_queue_alloc_security; struct hlist_head msg_queue_free_security; struct hlist_head msg_queue_associate; struct hlist_head msg_queue_msgctl; struct hlist_head msg_queue_msgsnd; struct hlist_head msg_queue_msgrcv; struct hlist_head shm_alloc_security; struct hlist_head shm_free_security; struct hlist_head shm_associate; struct hlist_head shm_shmctl; struct hlist_head shm_shmat; struct hlist_head sem_alloc_security; struct hlist_head sem_free_security; struct hlist_head sem_associate; struct hlist_head sem_semctl; struct hlist_head sem_semop; struct hlist_head netlink_send; struct hlist_head d_instantiate; struct hlist_head getprocattr; struct hlist_head setprocattr; struct hlist_head ismaclabel; struct hlist_head secid_to_secctx; struct hlist_head secctx_to_secid; struct hlist_head release_secctx; struct hlist_head inode_invalidate_secctx; struct hlist_head inode_notifysecctx; struct hlist_head inode_setsecctx; struct hlist_head inode_getsecctx; #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK struct hlist_head unix_stream_connect; struct hlist_head unix_may_send; struct hlist_head socket_create; struct hlist_head socket_post_create; struct hlist_head socket_socketpair; struct hlist_head socket_bind; struct hlist_head socket_connect; struct hlist_head socket_listen; struct hlist_head socket_accept; struct hlist_head socket_sendmsg; struct hlist_head socket_recvmsg; struct hlist_head socket_getsockname; struct hlist_head socket_getpeername; struct hlist_head socket_getsockopt; struct hlist_head socket_setsockopt; struct hlist_head socket_shutdown; struct hlist_head socket_sock_rcv_skb; struct hlist_head socket_getpeersec_stream; struct hlist_head socket_getpeersec_dgram; struct hlist_head sk_alloc_security; struct hlist_head sk_free_security; struct hlist_head sk_clone_security; struct hlist_head sk_getsecid; struct hlist_head sock_graft; struct hlist_head inet_conn_request; struct hlist_head inet_csk_clone; struct hlist_head inet_conn_established; struct hlist_head secmark_relabel_packet; struct hlist_head secmark_refcount_inc; struct hlist_head secmark_refcount_dec; struct hlist_head req_classify_flow; struct hlist_head tun_dev_alloc_security; struct hlist_head tun_dev_free_security; struct hlist_head tun_dev_create; struct hlist_head tun_dev_attach_queue; struct hlist_head tun_dev_attach; struct hlist_head tun_dev_open; struct hlist_head sctp_assoc_request; struct hlist_head sctp_bind_connect; struct hlist_head sctp_sk_clone; #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND struct hlist_head ib_pkey_access; struct hlist_head ib_endport_manage_subnet; struct hlist_head ib_alloc_security; struct hlist_head ib_free_security; #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM struct hlist_head xfrm_policy_alloc_security; struct hlist_head xfrm_policy_clone_security; struct hlist_head xfrm_policy_free_security; struct hlist_head xfrm_policy_delete_security; struct hlist_head xfrm_state_alloc; struct hlist_head xfrm_state_alloc_acquire; struct hlist_head xfrm_state_free_security; struct hlist_head xfrm_state_delete_security; struct hlist_head xfrm_policy_lookup; struct hlist_head xfrm_state_pol_flow_match; struct hlist_head xfrm_decode_session; #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS struct hlist_head key_alloc; struct hlist_head key_free; struct hlist_head key_permission; struct hlist_head key_getsecurity; #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT struct hlist_head audit_rule_init; struct hlist_head audit_rule_known; struct hlist_head audit_rule_match; struct hlist_head audit_rule_free; #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL struct hlist_head bpf; struct hlist_head bpf_map; struct hlist_head bpf_prog; struct hlist_head bpf_map_alloc_security; struct hlist_head bpf_map_free_security; struct hlist_head bpf_prog_alloc_security; struct hlist_head bpf_prog_free_security; #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ struct hlist_head locked_down; struct hlist_head lock_kernel_down; } __randomize_layout; /* * Security module hook list structure. * For use with generic list macros for common operations. */ struct security_hook_list { struct hlist_node list; struct hlist_head *head; union security_list_options hook; char *lsm; } __randomize_layout; /* * The set of hooks that may be selected for a specific module. */ struct lsm_one_hooks { char *lsm; union security_list_options secid_to_secctx; union security_list_options secctx_to_secid; union security_list_options socket_getpeersec_stream; }; /* * Security blob size or offset data. */ struct lsm_blob_sizes { int lbs_cred; int lbs_file; int lbs_inode; int lbs_sock; int lbs_ipc; int lbs_msg_msg; int lbs_task; }; /* * Initializing a security_hook_list structure takes * up a lot of space in a source file. This macro takes * care of the common case and reduces the amount of * text involved. */ #define LSM_HOOK_INIT(HEAD, HOOK) \ { .head = &security_hook_heads.HEAD, .hook = { .HEAD = HOOK } } extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads; extern char *lsm_names; extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, char *lsm); #define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0) #define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1) enum lsm_order { LSM_ORDER_FIRST = -1, /* This is only for capabilities. */ LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE = 0, }; struct lsm_info { const char *name; /* Required. */ enum lsm_order order; /* Optional: default is LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE */ unsigned long flags; /* Optional: flags describing LSM */ int *enabled; /* Optional: controlled by CONFIG_LSM */ int (*init)(void); /* Required. */ struct lsm_blob_sizes *blobs; /* Optional: for blob sharing. */ }; extern struct lsm_info __start_lsm_info[], __end_lsm_info[]; extern struct lsm_info __start_early_lsm_info[], __end_early_lsm_info[]; #define DEFINE_LSM(lsm) \ static struct lsm_info __lsm_##lsm \ __used __section(.lsm_info.init) \ __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long)) #define DEFINE_EARLY_LSM(lsm) \ static struct lsm_info __early_lsm_##lsm \ __used __section(.early_lsm_info.init) \ __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long)) #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE /* * Assuring the safety of deleting a security module is up to * the security module involved. This may entail ordering the * module's hook list in a particular way, refusing to disable * the module once a policy is loaded or any number of other * actions better imagined than described. * * The name of the configuration option reflects the only module * that currently uses the mechanism. Any developer who thinks * disabling their module is a good idea needs to be at least as * careful as the SELinux team. */ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count) { int i; for (i = 0; i < count; i++) hlist_del_rcu(&hooks[i].list); } #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE */ /* Currently required to handle SELinux runtime hook disable. */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS #define __lsm_ro_after_init #else #define __lsm_ro_after_init __ro_after_init #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS */ extern int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode); #endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */